Is banking really prone to panics? by Randall J. Pozdena
FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER
Number 91-35, October 11, 1991
Is Banking Really Prone to Panics?
Much of the social justification for deposit
insurance springs from concerns over contagious
bank runs, or "panics." In a panic, a run at one
bank (justified or not) precipitates runs at other,
inherently healthy banks. When a panic occurs,
it may result in a significant, and costly reduction
in total banking capacity and an attendant bur-
den on the economy.
The private market may not adequately protect
against contagious runs (through, for example,
higher capital and liquidity levels). This is be-
cause individual bank managers are concerned
only about their own profitability, and have no
incentive to limit the negative burdens or "exter-
nalities" they impose on other banks. Deposit
insurance and the regulation of bank capital thus
can be justified as a means of controlling the
externality problem by limiting the tendency to
run and increasing the protection against runs.
Despite its importance to bank policy, the theory
and empirical evidence of contagious runs is
scanty. In this Letter, we discuss the notion of
contagious runs as a consequence of rational
"signal extraction;' and use data from the be-
havior of bank stock returns to demonstrate that
there may, indeed, be a tendency for banking
to be prone to contagious runs.
Contagious runs
Policymakers' concern about contagious runs
or "panics" in banking has its roots in the turbu-
lent, early history of u.s. banking. According to
Klebaner (1974), for example, about 25 percent of
all banks that had ever existed had failed by 1861,
most during a panic. Significant banking panics
also occurred in 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, and
1907. And in all cases but one (1890), the panic
was followed by a deep depression.
The banking panics of this early period were of-
ten regional and often involved the largest banks
first. The panic of 1907, for example, began with
runs on the third largest and then the second
largest banks in New York City. The panic spread
first to smaller New York institutions, and only
later to country banks and other communities, a
pattern repeated in the 1930s.
While this experience was, and still is, frequently
taken as evidence of the importance of control-
ling bank runs, there have been recent challenges
to this interpretation. Benston, et al. (1986), for
example, believe that the rate of bank failures
was often much less than reported. In addition,
it is possible that the episodes of bank runs and
failures occurred because of widespread eco-
nomic weakness, and not the other way around;
hence, the widespread runs were not the result
of a "contagion;' but simply runs on many indi-
vidually weak banks.
Atheoiy of contagion
To help resolve the issue of the relevance of
contagious runs, we need a testable, theoretical
justification for a banking panic. That is, can we
posit a situation in which the depositors of banks
are well-informed and rational, yet still will tend
to "panic" and run on healthy banks?
King and Wadhwani (1990) recently presented a
model of contagion of stock market crashes that
seems to offer a relevant framework for a "rational
panic" in financial markets. This author has
adapted their model to study the case of banking
panics. The model assumes that investors (de-
positors or equity holders) in a particular bank
recognize that the value of their investments
depends upon two general types of factors. The
first are factors that affect the banking industry,
such as general economic conditions, or con-
ditions in particular asset markets that banks
have in common. Second are factors that are
idiosyncratic to individual banks, such as the
behavior of assets peculiar to an individual bank.
At any point in time, of course, the depositors
and other investors in the individual banks can
make only imperfect estimates of the behavior of
these factors, because their information is imper-
fect. In so doing, the behavior of Bank B may be
of interest to depositors in Bank A because of
common factors. Consequently, one task of thethe estimation process using the lagged return
on A as a statistical "instrument:'
Chart 1
The Contagion Coefficient By Bank Asset Size:
1980-1990
Second, the contagion effect is greater for banks
that are physically close to one another. If the
two banks are separated by the length of the
country, for example, the contagion effect is
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The findings are interesting, and support the
notion that contagion effects between banks are
significant and strong. For the entire sample of
contagion regressions, the contagion coefficient
averaged 12 percent. That is, 12 percent of an
idiosyncratic factor affecting Bank B will be
picked up by Bank A.
Statistical findings
Using this statistical method, regressions were
run using daily returns data from the 54 banks
whose stocks have been traded continuously
for the past 10 years. Each bank's return was
regressed on every other bank, resulting in 2862
regressions, each with about 2500 observations.
The contagion coefficients were extracted from
each of these regressions, and examined for rela-
tionships to the characteristics of the individual
banks involved.
The contagion coefficients were much higher
between certain pairs of banks and at certain
times. First, everything else being equal, big
banks had much larger effects on other big banks
than they did on sma! i banks (and a bigger effect
than small banks had on each other). This result
is depicted in Chart 1. This finding is consistent
with the notion that investors in big banks are
monitoring closely the behavior of other big banks.
The empirical implementation of such a study
involves regressing the returns to stockholders of
Bank A in each period on the returns to stock-
holders of Bank B in the same period. That is, the
theory predicts that the greater the contagious
propagation of idiosyncratic information, the
greater should be the regression coefficient link-
ing the two returns.
A consequence of this signal extraction process
is that depositors in Bank A will react to the idio-
syncratic factors that affect Bank B. That is, it can
be shown that information that should only be
"bad news" for Bank B can propagate to Bank
A. This is because the efficient search for com-
mon information tends to be contaminated by
idiosyncratic effects.
Information on the behavior of depositors in indi-
vidual banks is not easily available. The behavior
of equity holders, on the other hand, is easily
observed for those banks with traded stocks. The
approach taken here, therefore, is to examine the
behavior of stock returns at various individual
banks for evidence of a contagion effect. Presum-
ably, equity holders are better informed than
depositors so, if anything, their tendency to be
affected by idiosyncratic information should be
less than for depositors.
Measuring the contagion effect
Whether this contagion effect is important empir-
ically depends upon the validity of the assump-
tions of imperfect information, and the tendency
of depositors in Bank A to look to Bank B for
insight on common factors. Thus, it is important
to test the strength of the contagion effect
empirically.
From a statistical viewpoint, such a regression
is plagued by an important problem. Since con-
temporaneous returns data are used for both
banks, a simple regression would not be able to
distinguish the effect of A on B from that of B on
A. (This is called simultaneous equations bias.)
As it turns out, this problem can be resolved in
depositors in Bank A is to efficiently extract use-
ful information from the behavior of Bank B,
while recognizing their mutual dependence on
common factors. In economic parlance, this
involves rationally deriving an "efficient signal
extraction" rule.
FRBSFare in the same region. This suggests that inves-
tors expect fewer common factors to affect distant
banks, thereby weakening the transmission of
idiosyncratic effects. This is consistent with the
"regionalization" of contagions historically.
Third, the contagion effect rises very dramatically
during periods of uncertainty. In our case study,
such a period was proxied by the time period
around the stock market crash of October 1987.
The average contagion coefficient was over five
times as large during this period as for the sample
as a whole. This finding is predicted by the signal
extraction models, and implies that the propen-
sity to run can accelerate significantly during
times of financial stress.
Fourth, bank stock contagion effects are smaller
if the affected bank has a high capital/asset ratio.
That is, equity investors in a bank worry less
about transmitted effects from other banks if their
bank has a sizable capital buffer. This follows
from the concern that depositors are more likely
to run, and impose costs on the bank, if there is
insufficient capital to shield them from adverse
events. In our sample, an increase in the capital
asset ratio at a bank from 5 percent to 15 percent
decreases the contagion coefficient by about 35
percent in normal circumstances, and by 80 per-
cent during the 1987 crash period. This suggests
that higher capital ratios provide considerable
protection against contagion, particularly during
times of financial stress.
Finally, contagion coefficients among bank stocks
appear higher than those estimated for nonbank
stocks. Using a sample of stock returns from ten
randomly selected, broker-defined industry cate-
gories, contagion coefficients were estimated for
the largest firms in the industry category. The
contagion coefficients estimated were three to
five times smaller for these nonfinancial firms
than for similarly ranked banking firms. One
explanation for this finding is that the perform-
ance of a bank's assets is difficult for outside
investors to assess, causing them to rely more
on signals from peer performance than is the
case for nonbank firms. This, in turn, is consis-
tent with the notion that banks exist precisely
because the risk of certain credits is too difficult
for the marketplace to assess directly, requiring a
very closely monitored, bank-type relationship.
Caveats
Before translating these results on stock returns
into implications for depositor runs, several cave-
ats must be offered. First, it must be recognized
that the stock return contagion coefficients were
estimated in an environment in which flat-
premium deposit insurance existed. With this
policy in place, "bad news" is less likely to
result in higher deposit costs for a bank, thereby
cushioning equity holders. This means that the
contagion coefficients I have estimated may
understate the degree of contagion that would
exist in an uninsured banking system.
Second, the reaction of the value of equity to
a piece of bad news is likely to be more pro-
nounced than the reaction ofthe value of deposit
liabilities; this is because equity is the junior
security, and thereby cushions debt holders some-
what from deterioration in portfolio value. On the
other hand, because bank depositors hold debt
that is, by definition, redeemable on demand at
low cost, even small decreases in the perceived
value of those deposits may precipitate "runs."
~ I' \...onCIUSlons
Addressing these caveats is beyond the scope of
this Letter. In addition, we have not provided any
evidence that bank panics are costly to the econ-
omy. However, the results of our study are consis-
tent with a tendency of the banking system to
experience contagious runs. And the pattern of
contagion effects accords nicely with the historical
record of regionalized panics, and the tendency
for panics to propagate among big banks. This
suggests that ifbank panics are costly, a policy of
high capital requirements and deposit protection
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